Category: VC

From the source:Vietnamese Marines Fight Communist Infiltrators…

From the source:

Vietnamese Marines Fight Communist Infiltrators in Gia Dinh – A Vietnamese tanker fires his 50 Caliber machine gun into a Viet Cong position in Gia Dinh during heavy street fighting June 4. Viet Cong infiltrators had dug in along a wall in a yard and had to be blasted out.

Marines of Charlie Company, 1/5 Marines responding to enemy…

Marines of Charlie Company, 1/5 Marines responding to enemy fire, circa 1967-1968.

From the source:  Korean 1st Lt. with captured VC equipment….

From the source

Korean 1st Lt. with captured VC equipment. Notice the broken M-16, radio gear, RPG in his left hand, and our helicopter crew chief in the background.

“The Communist leadership regarded the Dak Ha offensive as ‘our biggest victory in the…”

“The Communist leadership regarded the Dak Ha offensive as ‘our biggest victory in the Highlands in 1961’ and reckoned that it ‘helped consolidate and maintain the masses’ faith in the face of the wave of enemy terrorism.’ Indeed, it seems that this second Communist offensive in Kontum Province within a year achieved quite dramatic results. It shook the South Vietnamese government’s confidence badly; made the ARVN nervous about operating on the high plateau, except in large units; revived Communist morale; and put the initiative back in Communist hands. It was followed by a widespread upsurge in guerrilla activity that included attacks on small government posts and road ambushes. The latter threatened to paralyze road traffic, and thus effective government control, over a large part of the Central Highlands and to jeopardize connections between the Central Highlands and the coast.”

Vietnam’s High Ground: Armed Struggle for the Central Highlands, 1954-1965 by JP Harris, page 61.

ARVN officer about to execute a Viet Cong prisoner. Photographed…

ARVN officer about to execute a Viet Cong prisoner. Photographed by Dickey Chapelle.

Operation CrimpDates: 8 Jan 1966 – 14 Jan 1966 Area of…


http://file.scirp.org/Html/2-1660400_74005.htm


http://vietnam-war.commemoration.gov.au/combat/viet-cong-tunnels.php


http://vietnam-war.commemoration.gov.au/combat/viet-cong-tunnels.php


https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=VA003022


https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=VA029832

Operation Crimp

Dates:

8 Jan 1966 – 14 Jan 1966

Area of Operation: Binh Duong Province, Hau Nghia Province, III Corps. Particularly the HoBo Woods, west of the Iron Triangle.

Allied Units: US Army 1/16th, 1/28th, and 2/28th Infantry of 3d Brigade 1st Infantry Division, 1/503rd and 2/503rd Airborne of 173rd Airborne Brigade; 1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR)

Allied Casualties: Unclear. An after action report from the 173rd Abn Bde cites “friendly losses” at 6 KIA and 45 WIA. These numbers likely do not take into consideration the casualties of 3d Bde 1st Inf Div, or 1RAR.

Enemy Units: Viet Cong 7th Cu Chi Battalion, D308 VC Company

Enemy Casualties: 107 KIA, 9 POW

Objective: Search and destroy, with particular focus on locating and destroying the headquarters of Viet Cong Military Region IV.

Significance/Notes: The Cu Chi Tunnels were discovered during Operation Crimp. This added a new dimension to the style of war being fought by the Communists, and necessitated a proper response from the US and its allies. Crimp was immediately followed by Operation Buckskin to clear the tunnels. (Note: Some sources combined the information from both operations.)
           The Cu Chi Tunnels can be visited today.

Sources:

Further Reading:

If you liked this post, please consider supporting The Vietnam War Era through Patreon. A donation of $1 gets you into our Discord server.

“CIA analysts were prepared to accept that in 1954-1958 Diem’s ‘intentions were…”

“CIA analysts were prepared to accept that in 1954-1958 Diem’s ‘intentions were good’ with regard to the Highlanders. But these intentions had been implemented halfheartedly at best. Diem’s government had actually ‘accomplished little’ for the Highlanders. Government officials in the Central Highlands were, in general, very poorly prepared to work with the indigenous peoples. Educational programs favored Vietnamese settlers rather than the indigenous population, and while ethnic Vietnamese expanded their land-holdings, talk of giving Highlanders definite titles to good-quality land suitable for wet-rice agriculture remained just that–talk. Government influence over most Highlanders was extremely limited. Road building was hindered by a lack of funds, so much of the region remained physically inaccessible to government officials who were not prepared to trek long distances on foot. More important, few officials were trained or motivated to cross the cultural barrier and gain the trust of the Highlanders. The result was increasing hostility to Diem’s government. By the end of 1958: ‘Four years after the Saigon government came to power it was… faced with growing unrest among the tribal groups and subversion of these groups by the Viet Cong. Since the government had found itself incapable of implementing a political civic action program it resorted to a military program and oppressive action to control the Highlanders which further aggravated the situation.’ Although the Communist Party already had dedicated cadres working among the Highland tribes, violence sometimes broke out between Highlanders and the government without Communist instigation and long before the Communist leadership thought the time was ripe for a serious armed struggle.”

Vietnam’s High Ground: Armed Struggle for the Central Highlands, 1954-1965 by JP Harris, page 37-38

“Even in the early 1960s, when guerrilla warfare was the norm, highly placed Vietnamese on both sides…”

“Even in the early 1960s, when guerrilla warfare was the norm, highly placed Vietnamese on both sides realized that the fighting in the Highlands would eventually assume a more high-intensity, ‘conventional’ nature. To the Communist high command, the rugged terrain and dense vegetation of the Central Highlands offered the best chance of ambushing and annihilating major units of the South Vietnamese armed forces and of drawing in and destroying their strategic reserves. When large American units arrived in South Vietnam, the Central Highlands seemed to be the most suitable place to engage them, too. Both sides seemed to sense from an early stage in the war, moreover, that control of the high ground looming over South Vietnam’s narrow coastal plain might ultimately prove decisive.”

Vietnam’s High Ground: Armed Struggle for the Central Highlands, 1954-1965 by JP Harris, page viii.